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Rhetoric and Skepticism in Antitrust Argument
Herbert Hovenkamp*

The adherents of the Chicago School of antitrust policy were once
an embattled minority, by their own admission perceived as a "lunatic
fringe" 1 by the mainstream, regarded as having little useful to say to
practical institutions like the courts. Under such conditions the protagonists of the Chicago School felt compelled to listen to the opinions
of the other side, take them seriously enough to understand them, and
then explain patiently why these views were wrong. 2 The other side
often had little to offer except rhetoric ("fairness," "entrenchment," 3
"Magna Carta of free enterprise"4 ).
The tables have turned, and the Chicago School now floats in the
mainstream of antitrust policy. But in a liberal society the duty to
defend a position is not dissolved merely because the position has
achieved prominence. On the contrary, positions that are no longer
defended lose their vitality - or, to put it another way, the best offense is an ironclad defense. 5
The most troublesome sign that an advocate is no longer defending
his position is the substitution of rhetoric for argument. To be sure,
language without rhetoric is impossible. Furthermore, rhetoric itself is
an important type of argument. Nevertheless, rhetoric much too easily
becomes a way of avoiding argument. For example, when a court dismisses an antitrust complaint about a vertical restraint by saying that
"restricted dealing is a way to compete," 6 it has substituted rhetoric
for argument. Those are very well chosen words. They are both con• Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. - Ed.
1. See Posner, The Chicago School ofAntitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925, 931 (1979).
2. See, e.g., Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19
(1957); Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960); Bork,
The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division (pt. 2), 75 YALE
L.J. 373 (1966); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted
Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282
(1975).
3. E.g., United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19, 24 (D. Conn.
1970), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971); see also R. BORK, THE ANrrrRUSf PARADOX: A
POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 253-55 (1978).
4. United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
5. For a discussion of one theory that has managed to stay alive and healthy only because its
supporters have continued to be innovative and diligent, see R. CLARK, THE SURVIVAL OF
CHARLES DARWIN: A BIOGRAPHY OF A MAN AND AN IDEA (1984).
6. Westman Commn. Co. v. Hobart Intl., Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1227 (10th Cir. 1986) (McKay, J., quoting Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule ofReason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J.
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elusive and expansive - but they prove nothing in themselves and are
not a description of exhaustive empirical work verifying an hypothesis;
in fact, they are nothing more than an expression of one opinion about
the competitive effects of vertical restraints. 7 Their ability to convince
lies in their aesthetic appeal rather than their empirical or analytic
force. 8
In his essay on Workable Antitrust Policy 9 Judge Easterbrook professes an extraordinary skepticism about economic models in general,
and particularly about the ability of courts to use economic models to
distinguish the competitive from the anticompetitive. But a profession
of skepticism is itself a very powerful rhetorical device; it creates a
perception of tough-mindedness, of refusal to yield real-world observations to analytic models or other abstractions, of extreme reluctance to
accept any proposition that has not been clearly proven. Further, it is
always very easy to be a skeptic, because every position ever taken except perhaps for a few tautologies - is capable of being doubted. In
that case being a skeptic means that one knows the outcome the instant the burden of proof is assigned.
Skeptical About What?

Judge Easterbrook argues that although the members of the Chicago School have many different viewpoints they share an extreme
(and healthy) skepticism about (1) the usefulness of economic models,
particularly novel models that suggest anticompetitive explanations
for firm behavior; and (2) the ability of courts to use models to distinguish competitive from anticompetitive activity. 10 This skepticism, he
argues, is based on many years of empirical research ("grubbing about
in the data"), 11 which casts doubt on older theories about why a myriad of business practices were anticompetitive. 12 Judge Easterbrook
exaggerates both the empirical nature and the unanimity of the work
135, 140 (1984)). Judge McKay also developed several arguments drawn from published analyses that the vertical restrictions in this instance were efficient and not harmful to competition.
7. An opinion, incidentally, which I share, subject to only a few reservations. See H.
HOVENKAMP, EcONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW§§ 9.1-9.4 (1985).
8. A reading of D. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS (1985), should disabuse
anyone of the notion that scientists, whether hard or soft, and including economists, are above
the use of rhetoric. They use it constantly, sometimes as an alternative to evidence, but more
often merely to conclude more than they have in fact established.
9. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696 (1986).
10. Id. at 1700-01.
11. Id. at 1698.
12. These include, among other things: (1) resale price maintenance, Telser, supra note 2;
Goldberg, The Free Rider Problem, ImpeTject Pricing, and the Economics ofRetailing Services, 19
Nw. U. L. REV. 736 (1984); (2) vertical nonprice restraints, Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981); R.
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he cites, and he does not cite everything relevant on the subject; 13 but
those subjects should be taken up in a different article. Here I am
much more interested in the nature of that professed skepticism.
Only an oddly selective skepticism about economic theory concludes that "restricted dealing is a way to compete," 14 that predatory
pricing never occurs, 15 that in the "long run" monopolies always correct themselves, 16 that apparently "naked" restraints should be preBORK, supra note 3, at 280-309, 365-81; and (3) exclusive dealing, Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25
J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1982). Other citations appear in Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 1699 n.9.
13. Very little of the work cited by Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 1699 nn.8-9, is empirical.
The two studies of resale price maintenance done under the auspices of the Federal Trade Commission, T. OVERSTREET, REsALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: EcONOMIC THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE (1983), and IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
VERTICAL REsTRAINT CASES (R. Lafferty, R. Lande & J. Kirkwood eds. 1984), are empirical,
but they are also much less conclusive than the others. The Overstreet study concludes that in
many situations resale price maintenance is inefficient, although it may be efficient for some firms
initially trying to establish themselves in a market. Judge Easterbrook cites G. STIGLER, The
Economics of Information, in THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 171-90 (1968), which itself is
not an empirical study, although Stigler did some empirical work on information economics. See
G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 1-4 (3d ed. 1966). That empirical work was consistent with
the hypothesis that as the price of a product increases relative to search costs, price variation
decreases.
The work on concentration and profits is more empirical; however, it is considerably less
conclusive, and it points in different directions. See Kaplow, Antitrust, Law & Economics, and
the Courts, 50 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming); see also Carlton, The Rigidity ofPrices,
76 AM. EcoN. REv. 637 (1986) (concluding that the duration of price rigidity increases as market concentration increases).
Likewise, Judge Easterbrook exaggerates the "overthrow" he describes of the "structure-conduct-performance" paradigm. Conceded, perhaps few economists now accept all the implications
of the "old" structure-conduct-performance paradigm. See Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 1698.
On the other hand, just as few entertain substantial doubts that there is a positive correlation
between concentration and likelihood of collusion, whether tacit or express,
Even with respect to the empirical research that Judge Easterbrook cites, too much of it
"proves" its conclusions by tests that are altogether too undemanding. Positive economics generally tests hypotheses by attempting to falsify them, and thus a hypothesis is successful if it survives repeated, diverse attempts at falsification. However, the standard for success of a
hypothesis in a particular study is merely that it be consistent with the particular data examined
by the tester. See the empirical study of information cited above in G. STIGLER, THE THEORY
OF PRICE, supra, at 1-4. This is good scientific methodology if its limitations are fully understood
and kept in mind. However, a single examination of data that fails to falsify an hypothesis does
not establish the truth of the hypothesis, but only that the hypothesis is consistent with the data
examined. The data might equally be consistent with other, conflicting hypotheses. An hypothesis becomes credible - particularly to a skeptic - only after it has survived many such tests and
all reasonable conflicting hypotheses have been eliminated. See generally D. MCCLOSKEY, supra
note 8. This criticism applies equally to studies based on empirical data and to the econometrics
and statistical methods applied to the data. See McCloskey, The Loss Function Has Been Mislaid: The Rhetoric of Significance Tests, 75 AM. EcoN. REV. 201 (1985).
Finally, Judge Easterbrook, just like others in the Chicago School (and, I suppose, practically
everyone else), cites things that support his observations and fails to cite things that do not. On
this point, see Kaplow, supra.
14. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
15. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981).
16. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEXAS L. REV. I, 2 (1984); see also Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 264 & n.249 (1985) (criticizing the view
that short-run considerations should generally be ignored).
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sumed legal unless the defendant's market power can be established 17
- in spite of substantial evidence, some of it from Chicago School
sources, 18 that market power is extremely difficult to assess. 19
"Skepticism" in this context refers to doubts about the ability of
courts to identify anticompetitive behavior as defined by a particular
economic theory. 20 Such skepticism is indeed healthy, and it explains
the great difficulty that courts have had with vertical restraints, predatory pricing, and other forms of ambiguous single-firm exclusionary
behavior. But, doubts notwithstanding, the court must decide on the
basis of the best information it has, including statutes, precedents,
models, and facts. The court, unlike the academic, cannot defer judgment until all the evidence is in.21
17. Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 21 ("The market power inquiry logically precedes the
question of whether a restraint is 'naked' and thus within the scope of the per sc rule.") (emphasis added).
18. See Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981);
see also Pindyck, The Measurement of Monopoly Power in Dynamic Markets, 28 J.L. & EcoN.
193 (1985).
19. A "naked" restraint is one for which the defendant bas offered no plausible efficiency
explanation. Why would a true skeptic about the court's ability to decide difficult economic
questions refuse to evaluate such a restraint until after it had assessed the defendant's market
power? See Kaplow, supra note 13.
20. As Professor Fox observes in this issue, Fox, Consumer Beware Chicago, 84 MICH. L.
REv. 1714, 1719 (1986), it is not the amount of skepticism, but rather its nature, that distinguishes the Chicago School from its critics.
One cannot even conclude that Chicagoans are more skeptical than most about the ability of
courts to distinguish competitive from anticompetitive behavior. For example, see Judge Easterbrook's proposal that courts evaluate the competitiveness of vertical restrictions by determining
whether the restrictions increased or decreased the firm's sales, or perhaps its market share,
Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 163-64. For critiques arguing that no court is up to this task, see
Hovenkamp, supra note 16, at 258-59; Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusio11: Raising Rivals' Costs To Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986). Judge Easterbrook may
be changing his views on the subject. In Workable Alltitrust Policy, supra note 9, at 1699 n.9, he
concedes that thus far it has been very difficult to test various theories about vertical restraints
because of difficulties in defining or measuring output.
Likewise, given the great difficulties attending market definition, and the continuing controversy about whether product differentiation can facilitate supracompetitive pricing even in markets defined as "competitive" under accepted criteria, the reason why a "skeptic" such as Judge
Easterbrook would want market power to be measured in virtually all antitrust cases escapes me.
See T. Campbell, Spatial Predation and Competition in Antitrust (Stanford Law & Economics
Working Paper No. 27, Aug. 1986). The question of how to measure market power in productdifferentiated markets is extremely complicated, and thus far no unambiguous answers have been
forthcoming. For criticism of the 1984 merger guidelines' approach to assessing market power in
product-differentiated markets, see P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ~ 919'
(Supp. 1986).
21. Judge Easterbrook appears to disagree. He concludes in the sixth proposition of his
"profession," discussed briefly below, that "[n]o question should be answered without adequate
data. The best data and answers come from a study of the practice. The next-best answers come
from extrapolations and interpolations from existing data." Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 1701.
In fact, courts are forced daily to provide answers without having adequate data. For example,
they decide death-penalty cases without knowing about the deterrent effects of capital punish·
ment, and nuisance cases without knowing the optimal amount of air or water pollution. In most
such cases, where it is relevant, the court decides by deferring to a legislative judgment. The
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Judge Easterbrook sees an antinomy22 in the arguments of the new
critics of Chicago School antitrust jurisprudence. On the one hand,
the critics fault the neoclassical market-efficiency model for being too
simple to account for certain kinds of strategic conduct. On the other,
they sometimes proclaim that the model is indeterminate, because it
gives only ambiguous answers to certain problems. Thus the model is
both too simple and too complex - or, at least, too simple and too
difficult for a court to use. The unstated premise in this argument
appears to be that no model can simultaneously be too simple to account for the data and too difficult to be applied in real world
situations.
In fact, the history of science has proved this premise wrong countless times; its path is strewn with the corpses of proposed models or
theories that did not "fit" because they did not account for the data
and because they failed to make relevant distinctions. Comprehensiveness as to the available data and the ability to distinguish in particular situations are two quite independent attributes of a good model and often models fail on both scores.
But no model is perfect. As a result a certain amount of trading off
takes place. Sometimes we adopt a model that we know to be too
simple, because it is the only one we can manage. Other times we
adopt a model that is difficult to use but that seems to explain the data
better than a simpler alternative. More often, we simultaneously work
with multiple models - applying the simpler ones when precision
must give way to economy, but the more complex ones when we have
other priorities. 23
Judge Easterbrook's professed skepticism about models leads him
to conclude that a skeptic will adopt the simplest model that accounts
for all the data. 24 That conclusion is good science, and I have no quarrel with it; but it makes my point as well as his. "Accounting for the
data" is a relative idea. Sometimes the older model explains the releChicago School appears to believe that the federal antitrust laws should be an exception to this
rule. See Hovenkamp, supra note 16, at 249-55. In any event, the fact that courts do not know
all they would like to know about a certain phenomenon is generally not a good reason for giving
automatic judgments to defendants.
22. "These are odd and inconsistent critiques." Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 1700.
23. Newton's and Einstein's models for motion and gravity - an example given by Judge
Easterbrook, id. at 1706 - reveal the latter. Einstein's model did not replace the Newtonian
model in most applications. On the contrary, the Newtonian model is probably "applied" far
more often than Einstein's. The engineer building an automobile or bicycle or even an airplane
has little need for concern about Einstein's critique of Newton. But the engineer building a
communications satellite or the astronomer bouncing radio signals off distant planets must know
it well.
24. Id.
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vant data quite well and the new, more complex model is unnecessary.
At other times, however, the older model fails to account for all the
data in a satisfactory way, and a more complex model must be
devised. 25
Courts and antitrust policymakers constantly adopt relatively simple or more complicated models depending on the issue, the relevant
policies and the information at hand. In fact, as Judge Easterbrook
notes, even an extreme neoclassicist occasionally sees fit to discard the
classical model when it fails to account for the data. 26 To give just one
illustration, the classical model expressed no concern about the "conditions of entry" for new firms - or, in modern parlance, barriers to
entry. Several conclusions flow from the premise that barriers to entry
are irrelevant. Some of these, ranging from the relatively narrow to
the extremely broad, are: (1) predatory pricing is irrational because as
soon as the predator drives out a rival and increases price the market
will be flooded with competitors; (2) the law against horizontal mergers is unnecessary, for new entrants will always be around to discipline
any attempt by the postmerger firm to charge monopoly prices; and
(3) the law against explicit cartelization is unnecessary, for any attempt to fix prices will be met with large-scale new entry by competitors, who will undermine the cartel.
At the risk of overgeneralization, very few antitrust scholars, Chicago School or any other variety, have accepted all three of these consequences of the classical model. In fact, proposition three, stated as it
is here, is broadly rejected. Proposition two is rejected by most in the
form in which it is stated; on the other hand, consideration of barriers
to entry has inspired many people - Chicago School as well as
others27 - to become much more tolerant of mergers. Finally, a great
deal of skepticism and debate exists about the merits of predatory pricing, with some Chicago School scholars coming very close to assenting
to proposition one in its stated form. 28 Courts or enforcement agencies dealing with these three phenomena also take three quite different
approaches to the concept of barriers to entry. They may be highly
concerned that entry barriers be established in predatory pricing
cases,29 somewhat less concerned in horizontal merger cases, 30 and relatively unconcerned in cases involving naked price fixing.
25. Judge Easterbrook agrees. Id. at 1706-07.
26. Id. at 1699 (discussing development of the economics of information).
27. E.g., P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, at~ 917.1; H. HOVENKAMP, supra
note 7, at §§ 11.1-11.6.
28. E.g., Easterbrook, supra note 15; R. BORK, supra note 3, at 144-60.
29. See International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 104 F.T.C. 280 (1984); General Foods Corp., 103
F.T.C. 204 (1984). Actually, the Federal Trade Commission has been more concerned about
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Likewise, as Judge Easterbrook notes - in apparent contradiction
to his own profession of skepticism - Chicago School writers have
often created their own complex models that provide competitive justifications for practices condemned by courts as anticompetitive. However, these models themselves do not account for all the data, as a
court must. Telser's famous article on resale price maintenance31 explained why certain instances of resale price maintenance are almost
certainly competitive: suppliers need to control free rider problems in
the delivery of point-of-sale services. However, that theory does not
explain the use of resale price maintenance for fungible products or
products where the delivery of point-of-sale services is unnecessary.
McGee's pathbreaking article on predatory pricing32 concentrated
largely on a single judicial decision, 33 and Judge Easterbrook's followup34 considered some kinds of strategic behavior but ignored others. 35
A court cannot wait for the next Chicago School explanation of why
these variations are also harmless. It must look at all the relevant
information available - which in the case of resale price maintenance
includes ambiguous economic theory, but a relatively unambiguous
congressional mandate that resale price maintenance be held illegal
per se. 36 The problem facing the court in a predatory pricing case is
concededly more difficult. As a result, the limited capacity of the judiciary to determine difficult facts and resolve conflicts between complicated theories may require, at least for the time being, some per se
rules about strategic pricing behavior. 37
I personally cannot take issue with very much in the eight statements in the "confession of faith" of Judge Easterbrook's Workable
entry barriers in predatory pricing cases than have most courts. See P. AREEDA & H.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, at ~~ 711.2-711.3.
30. Or at least there is more variety of opinion here. Compare the approach taken by the
Justice Department's 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984), and in United States
v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984), with that taken in 4 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW~ 917 (1980), and P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 20, at
~ 917.1.
31. Telser, supra note 2.
32. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & EcoN. 137
(1958).
33. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
34. Easterbrook, supra note 15.
35. See Williamson, Antitrust Enforcement: Where It's Been, Where It's Going, 27 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 289, 299-309 (1983) (noting that traditional studies of predatory strategies were concerned largely with predation by a dominant firm against an established rival, not with price
reductions as an anticompetitive entry-deterrence device); see also Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence, 69 AM. EcoN. REV. (Papers & Proceedings) 335 (1979).
36. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, at§ 9.1.
37. For example, the rule that a price above average cost is legal per se. See Barry Wright
Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 231-36 (!st Cir. 1983).
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Antitrust Policy school, 38 although I believe my own list to be more
descriptive of the Chicago School position. 39 I would add two propositions to Judge Easterbrook's list. First, I believe that any such
confession in a democratic country must make some attempt to acknowledge that the legislature has a hand in making policy, and that
this requires deference to the legislature even if its policy is inconsistent with the economic model espoused by thejudge. 40 Second, I note
that there is no necessary connection between the social wealth produced by competition and the private wealth produced by the firm
seeking profits. I agree heartily that the "desire to make a buck leads
people to undermine monopolistic practices";41 but the same desire
leads people to undermine competitive practices as well. In short, I am
far more skeptical than Judge Easterbrook about the notion that the
interaction of firms seeking profits will (almost) always yield a competitive outcome.
These qualifications aside, Judge Easterbrook's eight statements
are good starting points, but they explain why antitrust is difficult, not
why it should not exist. Granted, competition is robust and antitrust
is a form of "regulation";42 however all of law is a form of regulation.
We don't rely on competition to enforce contracts,43 and in the final
analysis we don't rely on it to define the proper boundaries of competitive behavior.
A truly healthy skepticism about alleged antitrust violations is appropriate. It requires a court to be careful to adopt rules and presumptions that circumspectly reflect every relevant consideration necessarily giving greater emphasis to those things it understands most
clearly and about which less skepticism is appropriate, such as the legislative history of the statute it is enforcing (political content and all),
38. Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 1700-01. But see note 21 supra.

39. See Hovenkamp, supra note 16, at 226-29.
40. For my objections to the way the Chicago School abuses the legislative history of the
antitrust laws, see id. at 249-55. Judge Easterbrook's characterization of the antitrust laws as a
"blank check," Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 1702 - another rhetorical device - is simply an
excuse for preempting Congress. Even conceding that the Sherman Act can be construed as a
"blank check" - and I make no such concession - I am baffled that anyone could make that
assertion about the Clayton Act, the Celler-Kefauver Amendments, or the Robinson-Patman
Act. See Kaplow, supra note 13.
41. See Judge Easterbrook's third proposition. Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 1701.
42. The conclusion that antitrust is a form of regulation is another use of rhetoric to suggest
that antitrust undermines the competitive nature of a market by substituting something "regulatory" instead, and today no one likes regulation.
43. In a competitive market only firms that complied with contracts would continue to receive business, for customers would not purchase from and suppliers would not sell to firms that
breached them. As a result, firms that honored their contracts would grow while those that did
not would wither. Under Judge Easterbrook's reasoning, judicial intervention to enforce contracts or order damages for breaches should be the exception rather than the rule.
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and relatively less weight to those things that are much more controversial and indeterminate, such as the choice to be made among conflicting economic theories.

